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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the welfare properties of the set of Dreze equi-
libria for economies with incomplete markets and rms. The well known
fact that a Dreze equilibrium need not be constrained Pareto optimal is
often attributed to a lack of coordination between rms. We show that
there are economies with a single rm in which no Dreze equilibrium is
constrained Pareto ecient. Even a unique Dreze equilibrium need not be
constrained Pareto ecient.

We are grateful to Jacques Dreze for valuable comments and helpful discussions. We
beneted from discussions with M. Browning, G. Demange, R. Guesnerie, S. Krasa, H. Pole-
marchakis, M. Quinzii, and W. Shafer. E. and H. Dierker would like to thank the Centre
of Industrial Economics and the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, for their
hospitality. Financial support from both institutions is gratefully acknowledged.
y
Institut fur Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universitat Wien, Hohenstaufengasse 9, A-1010
Wien, Austria
z
Institut fur Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universitat Wien, Hohenstaufengasse 9, A-1010
Wien, Austria
x
konomisk Institut and Centre of Industrial Economics, Kbenhavns Universitet, Stud-
iestrde 6, DK-1455 Kbenhavn, Denmark
1
1 Introduction.
In models of perfect or imperfect competition the objective of the rm can be ex-
pressed without recourse to shareholders' utility provided markets are assumed to
be complete. However, if markets are incomplete, rms obtain an additional role
since outputs are risky. As a consequence, the choice of a production plan does
not only aect the present wealth of the shareholders, but also their possibilities
to ensure themselves against risks.
The risk an individual shareholder faces depends on how his initial endow-
ments vary across the states of nature and, of course, on his preferences that
include his attitude towards risk as well as his personal probability assessments
concerning future states of nature. In general, there are many assets apart from
the shares of a particular rm under consideration that the shareholders of this
rm can use to hedge their risk. Incompleteness of markets, however, would be-
come trivialized if the rm could not inuence the total span of all assets. If
the production decision of a rm does aect the span, then one has to take into
account how the rm's production decision inuences its shareholders' utilities.
In order to disregard this eect one would have to explain why those consumers
who can benet from the insurance possibility oered by the rm do not buy this
insurance so that the rm is owned only by those consumers whose benet can
be neglected.
Once it is accepted that not only shareholders' prot motive has to be taken
into account, it is apparent that much more information is needed than a prot
maximizing rm in an economy with a complete set of markets is usually sup-
posed to have. Within general equilibrium theory with incomplete markets (GEI
for short) a literature has emerged that deals with rms on the basis that at least
detailed information on the distribution of shareholders' characteristics within
each rm is available. This development has been initiated by J.H. Dreze who
published a seminal article in 1974, which has been reprinted in Dreze (1987).
An extension of Dreze's original contribution can be found in his Yrjo Johansson
Lectures (1989). The book by Magill and Quinzii (1996) contains an extensive
exposition of the theory of incomplete markets. Production is covered in chap-
ter 6.
Although the informational requirements are highly demanding, it is, in our
opinion, desirable to ask how prot maximization as the objective of the rm
should be extended to the case of market incompleteness without resorting to ad
hoc short cuts. In this paper we want to shed light on the principle underlying
the standard solution concepts used in GEI with production. The basic idea
there can be summarized as follows. If a rm chooses a production plan with
random output, then all shareholders participate in the risk embodied in this
production plan in the same proportions, but they value future random income
in dierent ways. Thus, they face a social choice problem [cf. Arrow (1950)].
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The method now commonly used to overcome this problem, which goes back
to Dreze (1974), requires the production decision of each rm to be such that
the rm's shareholders cannot obtain a Pareto improvement through a change in
production, if they redistribute their physical wealth at the initial time period
t = 0 while keeping their shares xed.
Clearly, it must be ruled out that future endowments or future income can
be freely redistributed, since markets are incomplete. A promise of shareholder
A to give a (state dependent) sidepayment to B tomorrow in order to get B's
concession needed to change the production plan now is not credible in this
setting. On the other hand, the credibility issue does neither arise in case of
endowments hold at t = 0 nor in case of assets hold at t = 0. One may ask why
A does not use the assets available today to get B's consent. It is tempting to
say that it does not matter whether B obtains a certain asset directly from A or
whether A gives B the means needed to obtain the asset. This argument, however,
takes it for granted that assets can be acquired when sidepayments are made to
compensate the losers of a change in production. However, this possibility is ruled
out, since shareholdings are supposed to be xed when sidepayments are made.
We shall present examples with the annoying property that every production plan
can be improved upon by the choice of another plan accompanied by an exchange
of physical wealth and shares at t = 0 among the shareholders.
The concept of a stock market equilibrium introduced in Dreze (1974) is
dened for economies in which the distribution of individual initial endowments
is not specied. However, it is important to observe that in economies with private
ownership of endowments, sidepayments should be seen as merely potential. In
equilibrium no redistribution is made and the individual decisions leading to
an equilibrium are not aected by sidepayments. The role of the sidepayments
at t = 0 is to eliminate those production decisions which could be improved
upon by the shareholders if sidepayments would be possible. We shall later
present examples in which sidepayments would allow the economy to move to
an allocation that is Pareto superior for all consumers to the equilibrium under
consideration. Thus, if sidepayments could be made, they should be carried out,
but they are not
1
.
There is an important discrepancy between the role of sidepayments in the
equilibrium concept just described and the denitions of constrained feasibility
and constrained Pareto eciency. A social planner engaged in creating a con-
strained optimum can redistribute wealth at date t = 0 freely whereas agents
never carry out sidepayments.
In traditional general equilibrium theory with a complete system of markets
the issue of sidepayments we have just mentioned can be regarded as irrelevant.
1
These examples do not rely on rms failing to coordinate their production plans eciently,
since only one rm is assumed to exist.
3
A Walrasian equilibrium, in which no sidepayments are made, is Pareto ecient.
Therefore, no social planner is able to use his power to perform a lump sum
redistribution so as to make all consumers better o. Eciency and distribution
can be dealt with separately. However, we shall argue in this paper that the
discrepancy in the treatment of sidepayments described above becomes crucial
when the assumption of market completeness is given up. Indeed, it may well
be that the following scenario obtains. The equilibrium concept is designed so
as to incorporate the rst order condition for constrained Pareto eciency. Also,
constrained Pareto ecient allocations exist. However, none of the equilibria is
constrained Pareto ecient.
Readers familiar with Guesnerie's paper (1975) on marginal cost pricing equi-
libria will notice a striking similarity. The last three sentences in the previous
paragraph hold true in the framework examined in Guesnerie (1975), when the
appropriate words are substituted
2
. Guesnerie has shown that all marginal cost
pricing equilibria can be Pareto inecient given that wealth is distributed in a
predetermined way. Redistribution can be indispensable to obtain eciency. The
phenomenon discovered by Guesnerie also occurs in the present context and it
does so for the same reason. Guesnerie considers nonconvex production sets and
their nonconvexity entails, in particular, a breakdown of the rst fundamental
theorem of welfare economics. If markets are incomplete, the constrained fea-
sible set necessarily becomes nonconvex. This global nonconvexity entails that
eciency and distribution become closely entangled.
In the language of chapter 6 of Magill and Quinzii (1996), we are going to
analyze partnership economies. In particular, technologies will exhibit constant
returns to scale. The solution concept adopted is the partnership equilibrium,
which represents a simple case of a Dreze equilibrium. This setting has been
chosen, because it lends itself particularly well to a presentation of our ideas
without getting involved into additional, distracting issues. Throughout the pa-
per we try to avoid any unnecessary complexity. In Section 2 we introduce a
partnership economy with a single rm and discuss the concept of a partnership
equilibrium. In Section 3 we give an example of an economy where consumers
have quasilinear preferences and where shareholders's social surplus is minimized
at a partnership equilibrium. We also show that majority voting can entail a
unique outcome which is a surplus minimum. In Section 4 income eects are
permitted. We present an example of an economy in which there is a unique
partnership equilibrium that is not constrained Pareto ecient. The same result
can be obtained using von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Finally we
describe an economy with three equilibria, each of which is potentially Pareto
dominated by the remaining two equilibria. Section 5 concludes.
2
The sentences become: Marginal cost pricing equilibria incorporate the rst order condition
for Pareto eciency. Also, Pareto ecient allocations exist. However, none of the marginal
cost pricing equilibria is Pareto ecient.
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2 The Partnership Economy with a Single Firm.
The framework of our examples is the partnership economy with a unique rm,
which we are now going to introduce and discuss
3
. We consider an economy with
two periods t = 0; 1 and S possible states of nature at t = 1. The states at time
t = 1 are denoted s = 1;    ; S and the unique state at t = 0 is included as the
state s = 0. Thus, there are S+1 states in total. We assume that there is a single
good in each state. There is a nite number I of consumers. Each consumer i has
a consumption setX
i
and possesses the initial endowment e
i
2 X
i
. For simplicity,
X
i
is assumed to be the nonnegative orthant in R
S+1
. Consumer i
0
s preference
relation on X
i
is given by a C
1
quasiconcave utility function U
i
: X
i
! R which
is assumed to be weakly monotone. We assume that @U
i
=@x
0
> 0 and that there
exists, for any state s, a consumer i with @U
i
=@x
s
> 0.
Furthermore, there is one business venture available to the consumers. The
venture determines one production plan y to be chosen from its technology set
Y  R
S+1
, which we assume closed, convex, and containing the production plan
y = 0. In a partnership economy it is assumed that the technology Y exhibits
constant returns to scale [cf. Magill and Quinzii (1996), p. 356 f. for a discussion
of this assumption]. Production transforms inputs at t = 0 into state dependent
outputs at t = 1. Hence, y
0
 0 for all y = (y
0
;    ; y
S
) 2 Y , whereas y
s
 0
for 1  s  S. Since there is only one good in each state s, a production plan
y = (y
0
; y
1
;    y
S
) represents simply an asset transferring wealth across time in a
state dependent way.
At t = 0 every consumer i = 1;    ; I is free to become a partner in the
business venture, i.e. to participate in the corresponding asset. As a partner in
the rm consumer i invests a positive amount of input at time t = 0. In return,
he is entitled to the corresponding part of the random output at t = 1. Clearly,
all partners hold proportions of the same risky asset. Due to dierences in initial
endowments and preferences dierent partners will, in general, have dierent
views about what vector y 2 Y suits their needs best. However, it is assumed
that the venture can only commit itself to realizing one production plan. More
explicitly, it is not allowed that y is split into a sum y = y + y^ where dierent
partners can hold dierent proportions of y and y^. Asset splitting is ruled out
in order to avoid that markets become complete, but the model does not explain
why assets cannot be split. It is also assumed that there are no other assets than
the one created by the rm. In particular, we do not include bonds into the
model, since we want to shed light on the concept of a Dreze equilibrium in the
most clear-cut situation.
A partnership equilibrium in which the rm is active can be viewed as follows.
The rm proposes a production ray, i.e. a normalized production plan ~y
N
2 Y
3
The denitions in this section follow Magill and Quinzii (1996).
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with inputs at t = 0 equal to  1. Then every consumer i chooses individual pro-
duction activity levels ~
i
and instructs the rm to produce ~
i
~y
N
for his personal
use. Thus, consumer i will nally consume e
i
+ ~
i
~y
N
and he selects ~
i
so as to
maximize his utility given the production ray ~y
N
. Clearly, total production of
the rm equals ~y =
P
I
i=1
~
i
~y
N
and
~
#
i
= ~
i
=(
P
I
i=1
~
i
) can be interpreted as i's
share in the rm.
Furthermore, in a partnership equilibrium the following consistency require-
ment is made in order to generate a link between the interests of the group
~
I = fi = 1;    ; I j ~
i
> 0g of shareholders and the normalized production
plan ~y
N
. There is no alternative production plan in y 2 Y leading to an al-
location that is unanimously preferred by all members of
~
I after they have re-
distributed their initial endowment of the input commodity at time t = 0 in a
suitable way. However, shareholders are, by denition, not allowed to change
their shares
~
#
i
= ~
i
=(
P
I
i=1
~
i
) in the production activities when the production
plan ~y =
P
I
i=1
~
i
~y
N
is replaced by the alternative y even if the risk embod-
ied in y is substantially altered and their wealth is changed. Clearly, this fact
makes it harder to achieve a Pareto improvement through a change in production
combined with sidepayments among the shareholders.
Observe that the formal denition of a partnership equilibrium given below
is phrased in a way that appears to be dierent from the usual one although
the concept itself is not altered. Since the production set has constant returns
to scale, no market clearing condition for shares is imposed in a partnership
equilibrium. That is to say, the equation
P
I
i=1
#
i
= 1 should be interpreted as
no more than a sometimes convenient normalization. Indeed, there is no market
on which shares are bought and sold in a partnership economy.
We use the following notation. Sidepayments are expressed in positive or
negative multiples of the commodity vector e
0
= (1; 0;    ; 0). In order to in-
clude the possibility that the rm is shut down in a partnership equilibrium, the
normalized production plan ~y
N
will also be allowed to be equal to 0.
Denition . A system consisting of a normalized production plan ~y
N
2 Y with
inputs at t = 0 equal to  1 or ~y
N
= 0, consumption plans (~x
i
)
i=1; ;I
2
Q
I
i=1
X
i
,
and individual production activity levels (~
i
)
i=1; ;I
2 R
I
+
constitutes a partnership
equilibrium if
(i) for every consumer i = 1;    ; I, the bundle ~x
i
= e
i
+ ~
i
~y
N
2 X
i
maximizes
U
i
(e
i
+ 
i
~y
N
) subject to 
i
 0;
(ii) the group of partners
~
I = fi j ~
i
> 0g 6= ; and it is impossible to nd a
production plan y 2 Y and a system of sidepayments (
i
)
i2
~
I
with
P
i2
~
I

i
= 0
such that U
i
(e
i
+
i
e
0
+
~
#
i
y) > U
i
(~x
i
) for all i 2
~
I, where
~
#
i
= ~
i
=(
P
I
i=1
~
i
).
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It is apparent that a partnership equilibrium is a xed point, in which each
individual consumer determines his use of the production possibilities taking the
normalized production plan ~y
N
as given. On the other hand, when the redistri-
bution of wealth at time t = 0 among partners is considered in part (ii) to check
the optimality of the production plan, the proportions in which consumers use
the production facility are held xed.
By assumption, rms in a partnership economy have constant returns to scale.
The agents only face the social choice problem of determining a production ray.
The intensity with which an individual consumer wishes to use a production ray
once it is chosen is a purely private matter, since i's choice of any activity level

i
has no consequences for the production possibilities available to i
0
6= i. In this
respect, the use of a ray is analogous to the use of a purely public good with free
disposal
4
.
In order to illustrate the nature of the assumption that shares are held xed
when production plans are evaluated, consider the following analogy. The in-
habitants of town A are planning to connect A to another town B by a freeway.
There is no danger of congestion and the construction of the freeway does not
cost anything to the inhabitants of A. There are only private user costs such
as expenses for gasoline, that every inhabitant pays according to his personal
use. Also, suppose that individual 1 would like to drive to A twice as often as
individual 2. A meeting is called in A's town hall to discuss whether it would
not be preferable for the inhabitants of A to build the freeway to C instead of
B. Clearly, there is no reason to assume that person 1 will drive to C twice as
often as person 2. The benets associated with a freeway towards C cannot be
measured using data containing the individual use of a freeway to B. Therefore,
a comparison based on such an assumption can easily be misleading. For the
same reason, when partners meet to discuss a potential change of a production
ray to improve their welfare, they should assume that each of them adjusts his
personal use of the production facility according to his own taste.
It is well-known that condition (ii) above has an equivalent formulation in
terms of prot maximization [cf. Magill and Quinzii (1996), p. 364 f.]. This fact
can, of course, also be used to see that only the production ray and not the whole
production plan matters in the denition of a partnership equilibrium. Clearly,
a production plan y of a rm with constant returns to scale maximizes prots if
4
If we would deal with a model in which returns to scale are assumed to be strictly decreasing
rather than constant, the situation would become asymmetric. The public would appreciate
a decrease, but not an increase, in the use of a rm by every consumer i, since lowering the
activity level entails a reduction in unit costs. The asymmetry between the benecial eect of
a reduction of the intensity with which a person uses a rm with convex costs and the harmful
eect caused by an extension is not reected in any of the equilibrium concepts for economies
with incomplete markets and rms that we are aware of.
7
and only if y does for any  > 0. Dene the normalized utility gradient 
i
(x)
of consumer i by
5

i
s
(x) =
@
s
U
i
(x)
@
0
U
i
(x)
for s = 0;    ; S :
Then, assuming ~x
i
0
> 0 for all partners, condition (ii) in the denition of a
partnership equilibrium can be reformulated as
6
:
(ii') The group of partners
~
I = fi j ~
i
> 0g 6= ; and for all plans y 2 Y
(
X
i2
~
I
~
#
i

i
(~x
i
))  y  (
X
i2
~
I
~
#
i

i
(~x
i
))  (
X
i2
~
I
~
i
~y
N
) ;
where
~
#
i
= ~
i
=(
P
I
i=1
~
i
).
According to equilibrium condition (ii') prots of the rm are maximized
with respect to a price system which is the weighted sum of the normalized
gradients of the partners of the rm. Hence, the price system does not only
depend on the distribution of shares
~
#
i
, but also on the consumption plans realized
by the shareholders. In partnership economies with several rms, dierent rms
typically maximize prots in the sense of (ii') with respect to dierent price
systems in equilibrium allocations so that prices cannot at all perform the task
of coordinating production decisions. This fact is well known and the lack of
coordination of production decisions across rms has already been pointed out
by Dreze (1974). Hence, we will not address this question in this paper.
Since the optimality requirements expressed in (ii) and (ii') are designed to
capture the well being of the partners of a particular rm, we will investigate
instead to what extent a partnership equilibrium achieves this goal if coordination
failures can be disregarded. For simplicity we assume that there are only two
states at t = 1, which is the special setting used in the examples in the next
sections. The production set of the rm is then given by
Y = f( 1; ; 1  ) 2 R
3
j   0; 
0
   
1
g
for some 
0
 0 and 
0
< 
1
 1. Moreover, we assume that the initial endow-
ment of every consumer is e
i
= (e
i
0
; 0; 0) and that U
i
(x
0
; 
i
; 
i
(1 )) is strictly
quasiconcave for any given  2 [
0
; 
1
].
5
@
j
U
i
(x) denotes the partial derivative of the function U
i
with respect to the coordinate j
evaluated at x.
6
The reformulation in Magill and Quinzii (1996) is made under the assumption that con-
sumption plans lie in the interior of R
S+1
+
. However, in our setting the proof carries over to the
case in which ~x
i
0
> 0 for all i 2
~
I.
8
Consider a production ray  and a consumer i. Let 
i
be his optimal produc-
tion activity level and assume 
i
> 0, i.e. i is a partner in the rm given the ray
. We dene partner i
0
s marginal willingness to pay for an innitesimal change
of the production ray  by
MW
i
() =
@

U
i
(e
i
+ 
i
( 1; ; 1  ))
@
0
U
i
(e
i
+ 
i
( 1; ; 1  ))
:
MW
i
() expresses the marginal willingness to pay for an innitesimal change in
the production ray  in terms of the marginal utility of wealth in the state s = 0
at the optimal consumption bundle
7
. In general, this normalization depends, of
course, on  and diers among the partners.
The following Remark states that it suces to focus on production plans y
with input y
0
=  
P
~
i
in part (ii) of the denition of a partnership equilibrium.
The Remark allows us to keep the individual activity levels xed while checking
condition (ii).
Remark . Consider a partnership equilibrium with ~x
i
0
> 0 for all partners and
~y
N
6= 0. Then condition (ii) holds for all production plans y 2 Y i it holds for
all y 2 Y such that  y
0
=
P
~
i
.
Proof. First observe that y = 0 together with a system of sidepayments can never
lead to an allocation preferred by the partners. Hence, assume that there is a
y 6= 0 and a system of sidepayments (
i
)
i2
~
I
with
P
i2
~
I

i
= 0 such that U
i
(e
i
+

i
e
0
+
~
#
i
y) > U
i
(~x
i
). Let ~y = (
P
i2
~
I
~
i
)~y
N
. Then 
i
(~x
i
)  (
i
e
0
+
~
#
i
(y  ~y)) > 0 for
all partners i by Proposition 31.2 in Magill and Quinzii (1996). Let  > 0 be such
that y
0
= ~y
0
. Since the ~x
i
are chosen optimally, we have 
i
(~x
i
)  ~y = 0. Hence we
obtain 
i
(~x
i
)(
i
e
0
+
~
#
i
(y ~y)) > 0 for all i 2
~
I. Again, according to Proposition
31.2, there exists  > 0 such that U
i
(~x
i
+ 
i
e
0
+
~
#
i
(y   ~y)) > U
i
(~x
i
) for
all i 2
~
I, since ~x
i
0
> 0. Let y^ = ~y + (y   ~y) and ^
i
= 
i

i
. We have y^ 2 Y
since Y is a convex cone. Moreover, y^
0
= ~y
0
=  
P
i2
~
I
~
i
,
P
i2
~
I
^
i
= 0, and
U
i
(e
i
0
+ ^
i
e
0
+
~
#
i
y^) > U
i
(~x
i
)) for all i 2
~
I.
Now we give a characterization of a partnership equilibrium in terms of the
partners' marginal willingnesses to pay. This characterization is useful when we
calculate the partnership equilibria in the examples in the Sections 3 and 4.
Proposition . Consider the system (~y
N
; (~x
i
; ~
i
)
i=1; ;I
), where ~x
i
0
> 0 for all
partners i and where ~y
N
= ( 1;
~
; 1  
~
) is a normalized production plan with
~
 2 [
0
; 
1
]. Then (~y
N
; (~x
i
; ~
i
)
i=1; ;I
) is a partnership equilibrium i
(i) ~x
i
= e
i
+ ~
i
( 1;
~
; 1 
~
), where ~
i
is i's optimal activity level.
7
In the denition of MW
i
() the optimal production activity level 
i
could be allowed to
change with  according to Shephard's lemma.
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(ii") Let
~
I = fi = 1;    ; I j ~
i
> 0g be the group of partners. Then
~
I 6= ; and
(a)
P
i2
~
I
MW
i
(
~
) = 0 and 
0
<
~
 < 
1
or
(b)
P
i2
~
I
MW
i
(
~
)  0 and
~
 = 
1
or
(c)
P
i2
~
I
MW
i
(
~
)  0 and
~
 = 
0
.
Proof. From (ii') and the above Remark we know that
~
 is a partnership equilib-
rium i (
P
i2
~
I
~
#
i

i
(~x
i
))(
P
i2
~
I
~
i
)(0;   
~
; (  
~
))  0 for all  2 [
0
; 
1
] and
hence i
P
i2
~
I
(
i
1
(~x
i
)   
i
2
(~x
i
))~
i
(  
~
)  0 for all  2 [
0
; 
1
]. Moreover, by
denition MW
i
(
~
) = (
i
1
(~x
i
)  
i
2
(~x
i
))~
i
. Thus
~
 is a partnership equilibrium i
P
i2
~
I
MW
i
(
~
)( 
~
)  0 for all  2 [
0
; 
1
]. From this statement (a), (b), and
(c) follow trivially.
We are now going to recall the denition of a feasible allocation constrained
by market incompleteness and that of constrained Pareto eciency. These deni-
tions are inspired by the setting in which the rst and second welfare theorem in
general equilibrium theory with complete markets are formulated. As is usual in
the literature, any allocation that can be implemented by a powerful, omniscient
planner, who simultaneously determines all production plans, the shares of all
consumers and who, moreover, freely redistributes the endowments at time t = 0
in a lump sum way, is considered to be constrained feasible.
Denition . An allocation of consumption plans (x
i
)
i=1; ;I
is constrained fea-
sible if x
i
2 X
i
for all i and if there exist a normalized production plan y
N
and, for all i = 1    ; I, nonnegative individual production activity levels 
i
and
sidepayments 
i
at time t = 0 such that
(a) y
N
2 Y and
P
I
i=1

i
> 0,
(b)
P
I
i=1

i
= 0,
(c) x
i
= e
i
+ 
i
e
0
+ 
i
y
N
.
In accordance with the above denition of a feasible allocation, constrained
eciency is dened as follows
8
.
Denition . An allocation of consumption plans is constrained Pareto optimal
if it is constrained feasible and if there is no Pareto superior constrained feasible
allocation.
8
Since we shall later only consider allocations where the consumers have positive wealth
at t = 0, the strict monotonicity assumption concerning x
0
entails that one does not have to
distinguish between strict and weak Pareto improvements.
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In economies with private ownership of endowments, it is natural to check
whether an equilibrium is potentially Pareto dominated.
Denition . The equilibrium corresponding to the ray
~
 is potentially Pareto
dominated if there are a ray  and sidepayments 
i
at t = 0 with
P
i2
~
I

i
= 0
such that, after choosing their optimal investments given , all consumers are
better o.
Clearly, a constrained Pareto ecient equilibrium cannot be potentially Pareto
dominated. The examples in Section 4 show, however, that it can occur that all
Dreze equilibria are potentially Pareto dominated.
Magill and Quinzii (1996), p. 369, state conditions ensuring that a partnership
equilibrium satises the rst order condition for constrained Pareto optimality.
From this perspective, a partnership equilibrium seems to be a promising can-
didate for an appropriate equilibrium concept. However, the following aspects
deserve to be discussed.
Partnership equilibria are dened for economies with private ownership. In
this respect the concept is similar to a Walrasian equilibrium, but diers from
the stock market equilibrium as originally introduced in Dreze (1974), where, as
in the usual denition of Pareto eciency, only aggregate endowments matter.
Since no sidepayments are actually carried out, the redistribution mentioned in
condition (ii) should be regarded as potential only. A partnership equilibrium
is, so to speak, \redistribution proof". Correspondingly, there are obviously no
sidepayments involved in conditions (ii') and (ii").
This leads to the question of whether the information necessary to check equi-
librium condition (ii) is sucient to actually carry out sidepayments within the
group of partners. The answer is no for the following reason. To check condition
(ii) it is sucient to know the distribution of characteristics of the partners. How-
ever, to actually carry a redistribution through, one needs to know more than this
distribution. In order to give a sidepayment, that a consumer with a certain char-
acteristic should get, to the right person, one has to identify the person associated
with this characteristic. If only the distribution of characteristics is known, in-
dividuals remain anonymous and, although sidepayments can be computed, they
cannot be paid out. Thus, in terms of informational requirements underlying the
concepts of constrained optimality and partnership equilibria, respectively, the
planner in the denition of constrained feasibility is assumed to be able to know
which consumers have which characteristics, whereas only the distribution of the
characteristics matters in the denition of a partnership equilibrium.
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3 Quasilinear Preferences.
3.1 Partnership equilibria.
Since the potential redistribution of initial endowments at t = 0 plays a major
role in the denition of a partnership equilibrium, it is natural to focus rst on
a setting in which utility can be transferred by an exchange of endowments at
t = 0 without aecting the attitude towards risk consumers face at t = 1. Thus,
we are now going to assume all consumers to have quasilinear preferences that
are additively separable in x
0
. In this case, consumers' surplus is well dened and
can be used as a welfare measure. The role of income eects will be examined in
Section 4.
The equilibrium characterization in terms of marginal willingnesses to pay
as stated in the above Proposition shows that second order conditions are not
captured in the concept of a partnership equilibrium. Clearly, the envelope theo-
rem implies that portfolios which have been optimally adjusted to the production
decisions can be taken as xed as long as rst order utility changes are regarded
only. However, the following example shows that neglecting eects of higher or-
der can have a decisive impact on social welfare. Indeed, the consequences do not
only matter locally, but on the whole spectrum of possible production decisions.
In the following example - and most others in this paper - all consumers hold
shares for any production ray the only rm might choose. Thus, there cannot
be any coordination failure. As a consequence, any failure must be attributed to
the fact that, in the denition of a partnership equilibrium, production plans are
chosen while portfolios are kept xed.
We assume that there are two states at t = 1 and consider production rays
given by ( 1; ; 1   ), where  2 [
0
; 
1
]. We investigate the symmetric case

1
= 1  
0
with 0 < 
0
< 1=2
9
. For given , the input y
0
 0 at time 0 yields
the output jy
0
j  (; 1  ) at time 1.
There are two types of consumers with initial endowments
e
1
= (1; 0; 0) ; e
2
= (1; 0; 0)
and quasilinear utilities given by
U
1
(x
0
; x
1
; x
2
) = x
0
+ x
0:6
1
;
U
2
(x
0
; x
1
; x
2
) = x
0
+ x
0:6
2
;
9
The assumption 
0
> 0 entails that every consumer's share #
i
stays away from 0 for all .
It is made here only to avoid discussions about changes in the composition of the partners in
the rm.
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respectively. Ideally one should think of each type of consumers as being rep-
resented in the economy by a continuum of mass 1. For convenience, we shall
refer to each such continuum of identical consumers as a single consumer denoted
i = 1; 2, respectively.
For any given  consumer 1 invests 
1
= 0:6(0:6)
1:5
. Thus, consumer 1, who
would like to have  as large as possible, will participate in the partnership even
if  is small. For consumer 2, who would like to have  small, the situation is
analogous. Moreover, redistribution of endowments at t = 0 does not aect the
demand for shares. Therefore, the amount of x
0
needed to \persuade" a share-
holder to agree to changing the production ray from  to some 
0
is determined
in a particularly simple way.
In the situation just described it is not clear on intuitive grounds why the
shareholders should not be able to achieve any combination (; 
1
; 
2
) for them-
selves that a benevolent social planner could allocate to them. Economic intuition
suggests that shareholders aim at an outcome maximizing consumers' surplus
10
.
Before we analyze the set of partnership equilibria we would like to illustrate
the nature of the indirect utility functions of the consumers. The indirect utility
u
i
(x
0
; ) is the maximal utility consumer i can obtain if his initial endowment
is (x
0
; 0; 0) and he has free access to the production ray given by ( 1; ; 1  ).
Although the preferences are extremely simple, Figure 1 shows that the indirectly
preferred sets in the (x
0
; )-plane are not convex.
It turns out that the economy under consideration has three partnership equi-
libria A;B and C corresponding to 
A
= 
0
; 
B
= 1=2, and 
C
= 
1
, respectively.
It is instructive to investigate the interior equilibriumB. For that purpose we rst
consider the indirect utility u
1
(1; ) consumer 1 with endowment e
1
0
= 1 obtains if
the rm chooses the ray  and if he has his optimal investment 
1
= 0:6(0:6)
1:5
.
Since this utility equals u
1
(1; ) = 1 + 0:4(0:6)
1:5
, the function u
1
(1; ) is con-
vex. That is to say, the amount of x
0
consumer 1 is willing to give up for an
innitesimal increase in  is growing with . Similarly, the utility level u
2
(1; )
consumer 2 obtains if  is chosen equals u
2
(1; ) = u
1
(1; 1   ) and is convex
in . As a consequence, shareholders' social surplus associated with the ray ,
u
1
(1; ) + u
2
(1; ), is convex in . Due to the symmetry between u
1
(1; ) and
u
2
(1; ), the total utility u
1
(1; )+u
2
(1; ) has a critical point at 
B
= 1=2 which
must be a global minimum [see Figure 2].
10
Observe that producer's surplus is identically equal to zero due to the assumption of con-
stant returns to scale.
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Figure 1: Nonconvex preferred sets of agent 1 in the (x
0
; )-plane
Assume now that the rm has proposed to realize 
B
and the shareholders
meet to discuss this plan. At 
B
consumer 1 knows that he is willing to give up as
much of x
0
for an innitesimal increase in  as consumer 2 needs to be compen-
sated, since @

u
1
(1; )j
=1=2
+ @

u
2
(1; )j
=1=2
= 0 according to the Proposition
in Section 2. However, he also knows that he is willing to give up more than
@

u
1
(1; )j
=1=2
after  has been raised slightly above 
B
= 1=2, whereas con-
sumer 2 needs less than this amount to be compensated for his additional loss.
Due to the convexity of the two indirect utility functions u
i
(1; ) with respect to
 the compensation process gets additional momentum if the shareholders move
further away from 
B
= 1=2.
Notice that the situation changes drastically if the shareholders are deprived
of the possibility to adjust their shares #
i
to variations of . Consider consumer
1 who wants to choose his activity level 
1
in proportion to 
1:5
. If 
1
is now
taken as xed at its value at 
B
= 1=2, then the utility reached at ray  equals
~u
1
(1; ) = c
0
+ c
1

0:6
with a positive constant c
1
, whereas his indirect utility with
share adjustment is a function of the type u
1
(1; ) = c
0
0
+ c
0
1

1:5
with c
0
1
> 0.
Thus, by disregarding how consumer 1's individual activity level 
1
grows with
 the originally convex function u
1
(1; ) is turned into a concave function ~u
1
(1; ).
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Figure 2: Surplus minimum at the partnership equilibrium 
B
= 1=2
As a consequence, ~u
1
(1; ) + ~u
2
(1; ) is a concave function and the critical point
 = 1=2 becomes a maximum.
Suppose now that sidepayments can be made. Then equilibrium B can be
improved upon by a sidepayment combined with the choice of another ray. For
instance, put 
0
= 0:01. Consumer 2, who prefers the boundary equilibrium

A
= 0:01 over 
B
can oer a sidepayment of about 0.08 to consumer 1 if 1
agrees to switch to 
A
. If this deal is made, both agents are better o than
before. This shows that equilibrium B is potentially Pareto dominated.
In case of quasilinear preferences potential Pareto improvements are possible
as long as the social surplus of the partners is not maximized. There is always
at least one constrained Pareto ecient Dreze equilibrium, since a social sur-
plus maximum exists. In the present example the maximum is reached at the
partnership equilibria A and C.
Remark . The denition of a partnership equilibrium is not restrictive enough
in order to rule out that shareholders' social surplus is minimized at a partnership
equilibrium.
In the symmetric case considered so far consumers' surplus as a function of 
is a parabola taking its minimum at the interior equilibrium B. The boundary
equilibria A and C are both global surplus maxima. This situation is certainly
not robust. Indeed, by introducing asymmetry into the utility functions the
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interior equilibrium can be moved near to one of the boundary equilibria. As
a consequence, we obtain two \bad" and one \good" equilibrium. Consider, for
instance, the following setting:
U
1
(x
0
; x
1
; x
2
) = x
0
+ x
0:56
1
; e
1
= (1; 0; 0)
U
2
(x
0
; x
1
; x
2
) = x
0
+ x
0:9
2
; e
2
= (1; 0; 0) :
Using 
0
= 0:1 to dene bounds on , we get three equilibria corresponding to

A
= 0:1; 
B
 0:104, and 
C
= 0:9: Consider the total utility gain brought about
by the partnership. The gain reaches its minimum at the interior equilibrium 
B
where it equals 0.026221. The boundary equilibrium 
A
is not much better, since
the gain there amounts to 0.026236. The gain in total utility is maximal at 
C
where it is equal to 0.184.
In both, the symmetric as well as the asymmetric example, there is at least
one constrained Pareto ecient equilibrium. Since preferences are quasilinear,
surplus maximization can be used to obtain such a desirable equilibrium. In a
more general setting one would like to \rene" partnership equilibria by ruling
out potentially Pareto dominated ones. However, when leaving the quasilinear
framework in Section 4 we shall present an example showing that this procedure
leads into serious diculties due to the presence of strong income eects.
3.2 Majority voting.
It is often argued that a voting procedure should be used to derive the decisions
of rms from the preferences of their shareholders
11
. Clearly, the social choice
literature on voting is dominated by paradoxa and impossibility results. There-
fore, it hardly lends itself to the development of a general, satisfactory theory
of the decisions of rms. Here we want to ask the following question: Assume
that the above objection can be ignored and that majority voting leads to a well
dened outcome in all cases under consideration. Would it then be desirable on
welfare grounds to adopt majority voting as a social decision rule?
The following example illustrates the fact that the outcome of majority voting
can very well appear quite unsatisfactory from a normative viewpoint although
all shareholders vote sincerely. We consider both, the one person-one vote and
the one share-one vote case, and modify the example in the previous subsection
slightly in order to always obtain a unique outcome of majority voting. The ad-
missible rays are  2 [0:4; 0:6]. Observe that the modied example has again two
surplus maximizing partnership equilibria located at the end points of [0:4; 0:6]
and a surplus minimizing one at  = 1=2.
11
Majority voting as a decision rule for rms has been studied by several authors, see, e.g.,
DeMarzo (1993)
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There are now three (groups of equal size of) consumers having the utility
functions U
1
and U
2
as dened above and
U
3
(x
0
; x
1
; x
2
) = x
0
+ (x
1
x
2
)
1=3
;
respectively. To be specic, let e
1
= e
2
= e
3
= (1; 0; 0). Clearly, consumer 3 likes
 to be as close to 1=2 as possible, whereas the other two agents want  to be at
one of the endpoints of the interval [0:4; 0:6] of admissible production rays. As a
consequence, consumer 3 is a median voter. His most preferred choice  = 1=2
defeats any other potential  by a majority of two thirds, if each shareholder
has one vote. For any  all consumers want to participate in the rm and a
straightforward calculation shows that their social surplus reaches its minimum
at  = 1=2. The social surplus exhibits the same qualitative shape as in Figure 2.
The construction of the above example illuminates the fact that majority
voting and welfare considerations can be totally unrelated. We modied the
symmetric example in subsection 3.1, in which majority voting always ends in a
draw, by adding a median voter. Obviously, one can move the median voter's
best choice freely around so that the outcome of majority voting and thereby
the resulting value of social welfare becomes totally arbitrary. Observe that the
example is robust except for the fact that a slight change of the median voter's
utility function U
3
moves the outcome of majority voting to a  near the surplus
minimizing one instead of the minimizer itself. In particular, the relative sizes of
the three groups of consumers can be made unequal without any change of the
result.
Now we assume that majority voting occurs under the one share-one vote
rule. The number of shares depends, of course, on the  under consideration.
At  = 1=2 the shares of the three consumers are given by (0:363; 0:363; 0:273).
Therefore,  = 1=2 passes the test against any other  with a majority of 58
percent. Furthermore, consider any admissible
~
 6= 1=2. We show that
~
 fails to
pass a similar test. Obviously, in any comparison between
~
 and 1=2 consumer
3 always votes together with one of the other consumers against the remaining
consumer. The shares consumer 1 or 2 can have for any  2 [0:4; 0:6] are below
48 percent. Thus, consumer 3 is again a median voter and defeats
~
.
Remark . Majority voting can entail a unique outcome at which shareholders'
welfare expressed in terms of social surplus reaches its minimum. Thus, since the
surplus minimum is necessarily a partnership equilibrium, majority voting can
select the \worst" partnership equilibrium. The conclusion holds independently of
whether each person or each share possesses one vote.
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3.3 Mismatch of rm and owner.
We are now going to discuss shortly another phenomenon that can occur if we
allow the rm to be owned by part of the consumers only. For that purpose,
consider the asymmetric version of the example in subsection 3.1 and let  vary
over the whole interval [0; 1]. We obtain a partnership equilibrium at  = 0 if the
rm is owned by agent 2. Remember that  = 0 is optimal for agent 2 and that
agent 1 is not interested in becoming a partner if  = 0. Another partnership
equilibrium with agent 1 as sole proprietor is obtained at  = 1. At  = 0
consumers get utilities u
1
(1; 0) = 1; u
2
(1; 0) = 1:03874, whereas utilities at  = 1
are u
1
(1; 1) = 1:21036; u
2
(1; 1) = 1, respectively.
Consider the socially less desirable equilibrium corresponding to  = 0. If
sidepayments are permitted, it can easily be overcome as follows. If agent 1 pays,
say, 5 percent of his initial endowment at t = 0 as a sidepayment to agent 2 in
order to get full control over the rm, both agents become better o.
Observe that this Pareto improvement relies on the following facts. First, the
sidepayment is actually carried out. Second, the deal can only be done if shares
are not xed. Third, to obtain a Pareto improvement it is necessary that owners
and nonowners get together. However, the denition of a partnership equilib-
rium does not take any of these points into account. Moreover, this example
shows the close connection between issues of distribution and Pareto eciency
clearly. Also, it illustrates the point that the social planner in the denition of
constrained Pareto eciency is more powerful than the agents are in the denition
of a partnership equilibrium.
To conclude this section we want to point out an extremely simple, instructive
type of mismatch between rm and owner. Assume there is a consumer j such
that 
j
(e
j
)  y  0 for all y 2 Y . Then a partnership equilibrium is obtained
irrespective of the needs of all persons dierent from j if the rm is closed down,
i.e. ~y = 0, and assigned to j as the sole proprietor, i.e.
~
#
i
= 0 for i 6= j
and
~
#
j
= 1. Clearly, a partnership should, in principle, be available to the
whole society. However, as this example shows, the denition of a partnership
equilibrium is not suciently welfare oriented. Again, the reason is that part (ii)
of the denition is based on the principle that shares and thereby the membership
in the club of partners is given.
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4 Sidepayments, Income Eects, and Pareto
Comparisons.
4.1 A unique, but potentially Pareto dominated partner-
ship equilibrium.
In the previous section quasilinearity has been assumed in order to obtain a
setting in which the redistribution of wealth at time t = 0 does not aect any
consumer's evaluation of an asset. Although the existence of socially undesirable
partnership equilibria such as surplus minima could be shown in this particular
framework, one would expect additional, disturbing phenomena to occur if quasi-
linearity is not required. Clearly, if consumers' surplus is well dened, a surplus
maximum exists. As a consequence, there is at least one partnership equilibrium
that can be considered a desirable outcome. We are now going to ask whether a
similar conclusion obtains if income eects are permitted.
In the following example there are two types of consumers. The rst one
exhibits strong income eects while the second one has the quasilinear utility
function
U
2
(x
0
; x
1
; x
2
) = x
0
+ x
2
1=2
and the initial endowment (1; 0; 0). We take the power of x
2
to equal 1=2 for the
following reason. In this particular case, the marginal willingness to pay for a
change of  is constant. More precisely, since type 2's endowment is taken to be
(1; 0; 0), his indirect utility becomes u
2
(1; ) = 1 + (1  )=4. As a consequence,
the sidepayment that is just sucient to compensate type 2 for a change 
in production is of the linear form =4. For the same reason, the indirectly
preferred set of agent 2 in the (x
0
; )-plane is convex, but raising the power 1/2
slightly would destroy this property.
Types 1 and 2 are complementary to each other in the following sense. While
2's investment decision at t = 0 depends on the ray , but not on any sidepay-
ment, 1's decision will strongly depend on sidepayments, but not on . Therefore,
the eects in the example can be clearly attributed to the individual types.
As in the previous section, consumer 1 is only interested in state 1 while a
consumer of type 2 only cares about state 2. To embody strong income eects into
consumer 1's preferences we proceed as follows. Consider the CES-indierence
curve x
0:9
0
+ x
0:9
1
= 1 and take its image under the ane mapping (x
0
; x
1
) 7!
(x
0
; x
1
) for 0   < 1. The resulting indierence pattern denes the preferences
of consumer 1 in the part that is relevant for the example. We will calibrate
the example such that the consumption of agent 1 stays well below the curve
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x0:9
0
+x
0:9
1
= 1. In particular, 1's consumption of good 0 will have an upper bound
of 0:73 that is far below 1. Therefore, the \turning point" (1; 0) associated with
the above construction is outside the domain of interest in the example. There
is no need to extend the preferences to the whole nonnegative orthant, but such
an extension can easily be made. The endowment of consumer 1 is (0:95; 0; 0).
In the relevant range his preferences are given by
U
1
(x
0
; x
1
; x
2
) =
x
1
(1  x
9=10
0
)
10=9
:
A computation yields that maximization of U
1
leads to an investment into
production that is independent of the proposed ray  and that is of size (x
0
 x
10
0
) if
consumer 1 possesses the amount x
0
< 1 at t = 0 (after sidepayments). Therefore,
he will consume x
10
0
at t = 0. In a partnership equilibrium no sidepayments occur
by denition and consumer 1 invests 0:95  0:95
10
 0:35 so that approximately
0:6 units of his endowment remain for consumption at t = 0. Clearly, these
numbers vary if sidepayments are made. The pattern is such that consumer 1
invests less in the production activity if he is made richer. On the other hand,
if consumer 1 gives some of his wealth to the consumers of type 2 in order to
get a more favorable ray, i.e. a larger , consumer 1 invests more and more into
production.
Assume that there are one consumer of type 1 and two agents of type 2 and
let the technology consist of all rays given by the normalized production plans
( 1; ; 1 ) where  2 [2=3; 0:99]. The upper bound 0:99 < 1 is chosen in order
to avoid an autarky solution. A numerical computation shows that there is a
unique partnership equilibrium at
~
  0:7 in this example
12
.
We want to show that the equilibrium is potentially Pareto dominated by ev-
ery other  2 [2=3; 0:99], that is to say, it is dominated by every non-equilibrium
choice of , if appropriate sidepayments are made and agents choose their invest-
ment as they please
13
.
12
If we would add a third or fourth agent of type 2, uniqueness would still obtain, since the
marginal willingness MW
1
() of consumer 1 is decreasing and MW
2
() is identically equal
to the constant -1/4. More weight on agents of type 2 entails that the equilibrium value of 
moves further downwards.
13
We could also have taken the left endpoint of the interval smaller than 2/3. However, we
want to make clear that the phenomenon of a unique, interior equilibrium that is everywhere
potentially Pareto dominated over the whole range of feasible production rays depends on a
suciently strong income eect, but not on the particular way in which the preferences of
consumer 1 have been constructed. Therefore, the interval of feasible rays is selected here in
such a manner that 1's consumption at t = 0 after any sidepayment considered in the argument
lies far below 1.
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For that purpose, x the utility level of both consumers of type 2 at its
equilibrium value. Thus, put  =   
~
 and let each consumer of type 2 get
the sidepayment =4. Accordingly, consumer 1 gets the sidepayment  =2.
For  > 0 consumer 1 gets a negative sidepayment. As a consequence, he
consumes less at t = 0, but he invests more in production. A computation
shows that 1's utility is monotonically increasing in  > 0. Similarly, for
 < 0 the sidepayment to be given to 1 becomes positive. Hence, the wealth
and also the consumption at t = 0 of consumer 1 increase. However, due to the
restriction   2=3 his consumption never exceeds 0:73. That is to say, over
the whole range of rays under consideration 1's consumption at t = 0 stays well
below the critical value 1. Again, the utility of consumer 1 increases if  moves
further away from its equilibrium value. Thus, if the sidepayment given to both
consumers of type 2 is just sucient to make them indierent to their position
in the partnership equilibrium, consumer 1 does best if the economy moves far
away from the equilibrium ray
~
. The corresponding utility increase of consumer
1 is shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Utility increase of agent 1 after the sidepayment
Remark . There exist robust examples of economies with a unique partnership
equilibrium that is potentially Pareto dominated by any other possible choice of a
production ray .
If redistribution would be possible and sidepayments could actually be made,
Pareto improvements could easily be achieved. One possibility would then be
that consumer 1 gives an amount at least equal to =4 to type 2 in order to get
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2's consent to a change of size  > 0. For instance, if consumer 1 gives each of
his partners the amount 0.1 at t = 0, then all agents become better o if  = 0:99.
Alternatively, the consumers of type 2 could give 0.01 at t = 0 to agent 1 so that
1 becomes so rich that he cares suciently little about the ray . In this case
type 2 can obtain the  he likes most, i.e.  = 2=3. Obviously, if sidepayments
are possible, there are many ways to obtain Pareto improvements that aect
shareholders quite dierently. Therefore, if sidepayments were permitted, one
would need a theory selecting among a large set of possible outcomes. Apparently,
this fact constitutes a major reason why sidepayments are, in general, not carried
out in the theory of incomplete markets with individually specied ownership of
initial endowments.
4.2 Von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities.
One might think that the last example is ruled out if agents maximize expected
utility. Therefore, we address this question now. Suppose there is a lottery
giving an agent the bundle (x
0
; x
1
) with probability p and the bundle (x
0
; x
2
)
with probability (1   p). The rst component of these two bundles represents
consumption at date t = 0 and is independent of the outcome of the lottery. The
second stands for the consumption at t = 1 and is random. It is assumed that p
is the same for every consumer, since p is the publicly known probability that the
world will be in state 1 tomorrow. Moreover, each consumer has a utility function
over consumption today and tomorrow that is independent of which state will
obtain at t = 1.
More precisely, each lottery is characterized by the triple (x
0
; x
1
; x
2
) and the
number p. Preferences over the lotteries are dened by
U
1
(x
0
; x
1
; x
2
) = p log(
x
1
(1  x
0:9
0
)
1=0:9
) + (1  p) log(
x
2
(1  x
0:9
0
)
1=0:9
)
U
2
(x
0
; x
1
; x
2
) = p
x
1
(1  x
0:99
0
)
1=0:99
+ (1  p)
x
2
(1  x
0:99
0
)
1=0:99
:
Each consumer has an endowment of 0.98 at t = 0 and no endowment at t = 1.
In this example we consider one agent of type 1 and 3 agents of type 2. We
choose p = 0:45 and assume that the rm has production rays in the interval
 2 [0:1; 0:2] at its disposal. As in case of consumer 1 in the previous section, the
investment of both consumers considered here is independent of the choice of 
and depends on their wealth only. In particular, the investment is independent
of the probability p.
For every  2]0; 1[ each agent has a monotonically declining marginal willing-
ness to pay for a slight increase of . Hence the partnership equilibrium must be
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unique. It turns out to be at
~
  0:13. The equilibrium consumption of both
agents is about 0.82, which is clearly below the critical level of 1.
In order to avoid numerical methods to calculate the compensation a consumer
needs to stay at his equilibrium utility level when  is varied, we argue as follows.
The example has been calibrated such that for each consumer the indirectly
preferred set is the complement of a convex set (in the interval of rays  under
consideration)
14
. Therefore, we take the linear compensation scheme determined
by the marginal willingnesses MW
1
(
~
) =  MW
2
(
~
).
More precisely, consumer 1's marginal willingness to pay for an innitesi-
mal change of  is approximately 0.47 at the equilibrium ray
~
  0:13 and the
marginal willingness of each consumer of type 2 is MW
2
(
~
)   0:47=3. There-
fore, at the ray  consumer 1 receives a sidepayment of about  0:47  ( 
~
) and
each consumer of type 2 receives 0:47=3  (  
~
). Computing the values of the
utility functions for each of the consumers after this linear compensation scheme
is carried out one observes the following result: For each of the consumers utility
reaches its minimal value at the equilibrium ray
~
.
Remark . Even if all consumers have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tions, there can be a unique partnership equilibrium that is potentially Pareto
dominated by any other possible choice of a production ray .
4.3 Sidepayments and mutual potential Pareto domina-
tion of partnership equilibria.
In all the examples discussed so far there is at least one partnership equilibrium
that is not potentially Pareto dominated by another one. Thus, one might ask
whether such must always be the case. At rst glance, the elimination of part-
nership equilibria that are dominated by another partnership equilibrium seems
to be a rather modest selection criterion. However, the example presented below
demonstrates that it may very well be the case that no partnership equilibrium
survives this procedure. Since the example is nondegenerate, it shows that one
cannot even show the generic existence of a partnership equilibrium that is not
potentially Pareto dominated by another one. Indeed, in the following exam-
ple there will be three partnership equilibria each of which is potentially Pareto
dominated by every other one.
Clearly, the example is due to the fact that distributional issues can very
well aect eciency if markets are incomplete. As pointed out in Section 2, a
similar phenomenon has rst been discovered by Guesnerie (1975) in the context
14
Qualitatively, the situation is as in Figure 1.
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of general equilibrium theory with a nonconvex aggregate production set (and a
complete system of markets). Guesnerie has presented an example of an economy
with a given distribution of wealth in which none of the marginal cost pricing
equilibria is Pareto ecient. To obtain an ecient marginal cost pricing equilib-
rium it is necessary to redistribute wealth among consumers. The example we
are now going to describe rests on the same principle as Guesnerie's.
There are two types of consumers. The preferences of the rst one are obtained
by starting out with the CES-indierence curve x
0:9
0
+ x
0:9
1
= 5 and by taking its
image under the ane mapping (x
0
; x
1
) 7! (x
0
; x
1
) for 0   < 1. Thus, the
preferences are the same as those of consumer 1 in the previous examples in this
section with the exception that the consumption of good 0 must now have an
upper bound below 5 rather than 1. In the area below the curve x
0:9
0
+ x
0:9
1
= 5
the preferences can be represented by the utility function
U
1
(x
0
; x
1
; x
2
) =
x
1
(5
9=10
  x
9=10
0
)
10=9
:
The initial endowment of type 1 is (4:6; 0; 0). A consumer of type 2 has the utility
function
U
2
(x
0
; x
1
; x
2
) = 0:7x
0:7
0
+ x
2
and the initial endowment (1:7; 0; 0).
In the economy under consideration there are one consumer of type 1 and three
consumers of type 2. The rm can choose any ray generated by ( 1; ; 1   )
with  2 [0:01 ; 0:56]. To determine the set of partnership equilibria, observe that
the sum of the marginal willingnesses of all consumers is positive before it hits
0 at 
A
 0:41, and then negative until it becomes 0 again at 
B
 0:48, and
that it stays positive for  > 
B
. Thus, there are three partnership equilibria
corresponding to 
A
 0:41; 
B
 0:48 and 
C
= 0:56. At these equilibria the
consumer of type 1 reaches the utility levels
U
1
A
 0:407; U
1
B
 0:476; U
1
C
 0:553;
respectively. A consumer of type 2, who prefers low values of , obtains
U
2
A
 1:137; U
2
B
 1:065; U
2
C
 1:018;
respectively.
Remark . In the economy just described there are three partnership equilibria.
Each of the equilibria is potentially Pareto dominated by the remaining two equi-
libria. This feature is robust with respect to small parameter changes.
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First, we claim that the equilibrium A corresponding to 
A
is potentially
Pareto dominated by both other equilibria, B and C. This can be seen as follows.
Since consumer 1 prefers 
B
over 
A
, but his partners do not, consumer 1 has
to check whether the amount he needs to give them so that their utility level
does not fall below U
2
A
is not so large that he is not compensated for the loss by
obtaining the preferred ray 
B
. Suppose now that consumer 1 gives to each of
his partners 0.14 units of wealth at t = 0. Then his initial endowment at t = 0
becomes 4:6  0:42 = 4:18. A computation shows that his partners are better o
at 
B
, if they receive the sidepayment 0.14 so that they have no reason to turn
the oer down. Also, consumer 1 gains, since his utility rises from 0.407 to 0.412.
Therefore, equilibrium A is potentially Pareto dominated by B.
To see that A is also potentially Pareto dominated by C, assume that con-
sumer 1 now distributes 0.84 units of wealth at t = 0 evenly among his partners.
If 
C
is chosen, consumer 1 reaches the utility level 0.425 and his partners obtain
the utility 1.141. Again, this represents a potential Pareto improvement.
Next, we claim that equilibrium B is potentially Pareto dominated by A and
also by B. If each of the consumers of type 2 gives 0.1 to consumer 1 and they
switch to 
A
, then 1's utility rises from 0.476 to 0.492 and the utility of each of
the consumers of type 1 goes up from 1.065 to 1.078. Similarly, if consumer 1
gives each of the consumers of type 2 the amount 0.13 and 
C
is chosen, then all
consumers are better o.
Finally, we claim that C is potentially Pareto dominated by A and by B.
If 1 obtains a sidepayment of size 0.37 and production switches to 
A
, then 1's
utility goes up from 0.553 to 0.567, whereas his partners reach the utility level
1:065 > 1:018. In order to go to the ray 
B
, consider a sidepayment to consumer
1 of size 3  0:09 = 0:27 in order to get a potential Pareto improvement.
The situation can best be summarized in a drawing. For that purpose, con-
sider rst the partnership equilibrium A and x the utility level U
2
A
each of the
consumers of type 2 obtains at A. There is a well dened change x
A
0
() of
the initial wealth of each consumer of type 2 such that he reaches precisely the
utility level U
2
A
, if his initial endowment is (e
2
0
+ x
A
0
(); 0 ; 0) and the ray  is
chosen. Since there are 3 consumers of type 2, the amount  3 x
A
0
() can be
made available to consumer 1. The continuous line touching the horizontal axis
at 
A
 0:41 shows the utility increase over U
1
A
agent 1 can obtain at the ray 
if he receives the sidepayment  3 x
A
0
(). Clearly, Figure 4 shows that agent 1
can be made better o at B as well as at C than he is at the reference equilibrium
A without any other agent being worse o. A similar statement also holds true
for the rays in between the equilibria.
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The dashed line that is tangent to the horizontal axis at 
B
 0:48 shows the
utility increase consumer 1 can get over the utility level U
1
B
if the consumers of
type 2 get sidepayments that keep them precisely at U
2
B
. Similarly, the dashed-
dotted line cutting the horizontal axis from below at 
C
= 0:56 indicates con-
sumer 1's utility increase corresponding to the third equilibrium C.
0.425 0.45 0.475 0.5 0.525 0.55
Figure 4: Mutual domination after sidepayments
We could have chosen 
B
as upper bound for  in order to get an economy with
two equilibria each of them being potentially dominated by the other one. How-
ever, this example would not have been robust, since extending the technology to
rays arbitrarily little above 
B
would have given rise to a third equilibrium at the
upper bound. The bound 0.56 has been selected in order to make the additional
boundary equilibrium C potentially Pareto dominated by both other equilibria.
5 Conclusion
We have examined the welfare properties of Dreze equilibria in the particularly
simple framework of a partnership economy with a single rm in order to rule
out the well-known coordination failures across rms. These equilibria can be
characterized in terms of the gradients of the utility functions of the partners and
can be computed by nding the zeros of the sum of the marginal willingnesses
to pay for an innitesimal change of the production plan aggregated over all
partners. This characterization captures the rst order condition of constrained
Pareto eciency.
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Examples show that majority voting can result in a uniquely determined
outcome at which shareholders' social surplus is near to its minimum, because
this is the outcome preferred by the median voter. Thus, we are led to conclude
that majority voting does not constitute a sound basis for a welfare oriented
theory of the behavior of a rm when markets are incomplete, even if strategic
misrepresentation of voters' preferences can be disregarded. A major dierence
between outcomes of majority voting and Dreze equilibria can be expressed as
follows: The rm's production decision is governed by the utility gradient of the
median shareholder in case of voting whereas it depends on the weighted sum of
the utility gradients of all shareholders in case of Dreze equilibria and is thereby
more closely related to shareholders' social surplus.
However, even if consumers have quasilinear preferences the set of Dreze equi-
libria can have undesirable properties. In particular, at a Dreze equilibrium
shareholders' social surplus can reach its minimum. This is due to the fact that
the denition of a Dreze equilibrium only takes welfare changes of rst order into
account. Thus, no distinction is made between an interior maximum and any
other critical point.
More importantly, if the framework of quasilinear preferences is left, robust
examples of economies with a unique, but constrained Pareto inecient equi-
librium can be given. Therefore, the inclusion of higher order welfare changes
would entail a renement of the equilibrium concept that can lead to nonexis-
tence. Moreover, restricting attention to expected utility maximization does not
rule out situations in which the unique Dreze equilibrium is socially undesirable.
A constrained Pareto ecient equilibrium cannot be potentially Pareto dom-
inated [see Section 2 for a precise denition]. However, there exist nondegenerate
examples with multiple Dreze equilibria each of which is potentially Pareto dom-
inated by every other one.
These disturbing phenomena can be explained as follows. It has already been
emphasized by Dreze (1974) that the set of feasible consumption allocations is
necessarily nonconvex due to the fact that shares #
i
and production plans y enter
the denition of feasibility in a multiplicative way. Clearly, whenever one of the
factors #
i
and y is kept constant while the other one is varied, the product be-
comes linear and the nonconvexity remains ineective. The very structure of the
denition of a partnership equilibrium as a xed point with two properties refer-
ring to consumption and production, respectively, builds upon such a separation
of changes in shares #
i
and changes in production y. For the same reason, this
denition does not capture welfare eects of second or higher order. If one takes
the welfare eects fully into account and imposes the condition that equilibria
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must not be potentially Pareto dominated, the nonconvexity of the feasible set
may very well lead to the nonexistence of potentially undominated equilibria.
Our examples reect the presence of a severe conict between issues of distri-
bution and constrained Pareto optimality if the set of feasible states is nonconvex,
that is absent in the theory of perfect competition with complete markets. Ac-
cording to the rst and second welfare theorem lump sum redistributions and
eciency do not interfere with each other. That is to say, lump sum redistri-
bution is neither needed to obtain Pareto eciency in a Walrasian equilibrium
nor does it prevent equilibria from being ecient if it is performed. However,
Guesnerie discovered that the intuition conveyed by the rst and second wel-
fare theorem hinges upon the assumption that global nonconvexities are absent.
More precisely, Guesnerie (1975) investigated the eciency of marginal cost pric-
ing equilibria when the technology is nonconvex and pointed out that the above
intuition becomes false due to the presence of the nonconvexity. As shown in this
paper, the phenomenon discovered by Guesnerie has important consequences for
the theory of incomplete markets.
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